After numerous military and political blows to the Iranian regime, Ali Khamenei now finds himself in the weakest position of power he has ever held within the regime’s political structure. The trajectory of domestic and regional developments shows that the system no longer possesses the strength or cohesion it once had to fully impose its ideological will—either at home or across the region. The regime’s bankrupt economy, the growing rifts between its security, political, and economic institutions on one hand, and the deep divide between society and the state on the other, have driven the government into a defensive and reactionary posture.

At present, after decades of ideological and political framework, the government lacks the capacity for a rapid or fundamental shift. The formation of power in Iran is inherently built upon repression and control, and any sudden change in political or ideological direction leads to an internal collapse. Nonetheless, in its current weakened state—and in the absence of a comprehensive, ready alternative—the regime is able to make limited, controlled concessions in certain areas to maintain a veneer of legitimacy.

In this context, there are signs of the regime’s reluctant acquiescence to optional hijab at some social levels, as well as its limited tolerance for mild criticism in official media such as radio, television, and newspapers. These gestures are not borne of genuine reform or a move toward reformism, but are tactical efforts to manage a legitimacy crisis and reduce social tension. The government seeks to placate domestic public opinion and international pressure by opening symbolic, superficial “windows,” without allowing any real damage to its authoritarian core.

Still, the regime’s red lines remain firmly in place. The escalating executions of political prisoners and protesters, the harsh repression of social and political activists, and systematic pressure on various ethnic groups all show that the system is unwilling to relinquish the core instruments of its survival. While limited discussion on hijab or social issues is now permitted within controlled boundaries, any fundamental demand for justice, freedom, or ethnic equality continues to be met with violence.

In the field of environmental policy, the regime is effectively paralyzed. Despite the applause of reformist environmentalists (such as Mohammad Darvish and co) for the regime’s hollow gestures—like officials riding bicycles or offering meaningless speeches and empty promises—the government, even if it wished to stage similar symbolic maneuvers as in the hijab issue, is incapable of taking any real action to reverse environmental destruction.

On the other side, the opposition has not yet shown a new or decisive face in this new situation. Even as the regime finds itself in the weakest position of its lifetime—precisely the moment when a united alternative could take advantage of the situation—domestic movement centers primarily around political prisoners’ protests and the “No to Executions” campaign. For years, the opposition had been waiting for the collapse of the regime’s proxy forces in the Middle East, the paralysis of its regional war machine, the end of Western appeasement policies, and the regime’s retreat on issues such as hijab. Now that these factors have largely materialized, no serious or tangible threat from opposition forces has emerged.

This paralysis is also visible among ethnic movements. The divisions between Turks and Kurdish groups inside Iran (and the regime’s exploitation of them), the influence of passivity encouraged by Molavi Abdolhamid in Baluchistan, and the unpreparedness of other national groups—many of which are still in the process of asserting their own identities—are additional factors contributing to this stagnation. In Kurdistan of Iran, the serious and genuine parties and movements that maintain organic ties to parts of local society—and have always aspired to weaken the central government—are now largely passive observers.

From a broader perspective, however, these shortcomings are not unique to any specific opposition faction—whether national or ethnic. The root problem lies in the absence of a comprehensive, trusted alternative capable of uniting diverse social classes and sectors. Moreover, the disruptive influence of far-right currents—manifested in the promotion of monarchist discourse by leveraging the rise of the far right in the U.S. and the destructive support of Israel’s ruling right-wing faction for Reza Pahlavi (son of former Shah)—has further obstructed the emergence of a cohesive opposition front.

In the absence of an organized, inclusive alternative, the regime will attempt to maintain control of the political space through continued repression. However, the fragile balance now in place suggests that even repression may no longer guarantee lasting stability. The Islamic Republic today is suspended more than ever between temporary survival and gradual collapse.