The Iranian government’s response to the U.S. proposal last weekend triggered a furious reaction from Trump, with the American president reportedly saying he “didn’t even read the letter to the end” and dismissing it as “garbage.”

According to published reports, Iran’s response to Washington’s proposal centered on several key demands:

• A complete halt to U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran and its allied forces in the region;
• The lifting of oil and financial sanctions; an end to the naval blockade and the release of Iran’s frozen assets;
• Recognition of some form of Iranian authority or control over the Strait of Hormuz;
• Continuation of the ceasefire only if maritime routes are mutually reopened and negotiations move forward;
• Refusal to explicitly accept a full suspension of the nuclear program or abandon uranium enrichment and the missile program.

What provoked Washington’s sharp negative reaction was Tehran’s refusal to clearly renounce continuation of its nuclear program. In addition, Iran’s position on the Strait of Hormuz and demands for war reparations were viewed in Washington as an attempt to impose conditions “from a position of victory.”

Meanwhile, the U.S. naval blockade continues to tighten pressure on the Iranian government’s economic lifeline, and any delay in reaching an agreement further drives down the value of the Rial, fuels soaring prices and severe inflation in essential goods for ordinary Iranians, and contributes to rising oil prices and inflation across global markets.

At the same time, the Iran’s regime, after effectively testing the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in practice, now appear to see the strait itself as the deterrent leverage they had spent decades pursuing through their nuclear program. As a result, they seem convinced they can extract greater concessions from the United States. Despite the devastating blows the Iranian regime suffered during the forty-day war and the loss of a long line of senior leaders, the regime now appears to possess a level of confidence unprecedented in its history. The Iranian regime resembles someone struck by a big rig, his internal organs spilled out, yet still convinced that the angel of death is incapable of finishing him off and therefore certain he will survive the crash. By effectively holding millions of Iranians hostage, people unable to protest under wartime conditions, the regime demonstrates that it can endure the pain of war longer than its adversaries can. In this context, the sharp rise in the regime’s criminal execution of political prisoners is not merely intended to deepen fear and terror within society; it also serves as a message to Trump that he cannot count on a popular uprising under current conditions.

The consequences of the current “neither war nor peace” deadlock were evident even during Trump’s trip to Beijing and his meeting with China’s president. Despite lavish ceremonies, the visit produced no major achievements for Washington. The failure to reach agreements on rare earth elements, along with tensions over Taiwan, which Xi raised directly on the first day by warning the United States over its support for the island, were signs that, according to political analysts, partly reflected Washington’s inability to present a viable exit strategy from the Iran conflict.

Trump’s contradictory messages toward Iran after returning from Beijing continue to reflect the same absence of a coherent strategy. He has said he is waiting for Tehran’s response to new proposals, while simultaneously declaring that he could destroy all of Iran’s power plants and bridges within two days. In reality, Trump’s options in the current stalemate are limited. The U.S. administration must either settle for an agreement comparable to, or even weaker than, the JCPOA and declare victory, or attempt to strengthen its position through a ground military offensive. Given the state of the global economy and domestic conditions in the United States ahead of the midterm elections, analysts consider the first option more likely.