On the eighth day of the war, after Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the bombing of oil refineries, oil storage depots, and other infrastructure, Iran moved another step closer to a scorched-earth scenario. Earlier that same day, Israel had also bombed Mehrabad International Airport, destroying 17 passenger aircraft. Israel justified the operation by claiming that the Iranian regime used these planes to support proxy forces and Hezbollah. This came despite Netanyahu’s repeated assurances to the Iranian people that Israel would only target military forces and bases belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and security institutions, something that, aside from one or two cases, had largely been observed during the first week of the war.

Beyond Israel’s shift in military tactics against the Iranian regime, the most significant developments on the eighth day were related to a sharp turn in the positions of Donald Trump, a change that, even by his own standards of political inconsistency, set a new record. After Javad Larijani, the commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, and Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei publicly opposed remarks by Masoud Pezeshkian, regime’s president, about halting attacks on Arab countries, and as both verbal threats and actions (including an attack on an airport in the United Arab Emirates) escalated, Trump delivered a series of brief but controversial remarks to reporters. When asked whether Iran’s map would remain the same after the war, he said: “I can’t tell you. Probably not.” Earlier, when speaking about his role in shaping the future government after the fall of the Islamic Republic, Trump said that this time they were being careful to ensure that people who might have suitable leadership qualities for the future were not killed in U.S. attacks.

However, Trump’s larger shift concerned the Kurdish political forces of Iranian Kurdistan. Recently, five Kurdish political parties in Iranian Kurdistan (later six) had announced the formation of a coalition as one possible way to bring an end to the battered regime that still holds power through the remaining forces of the Revolutionary Guard and street gangs controlling squares and streets by force of arms. In this context, Trump and the U.S. State Department had also held discussions with Kurdish leaders in the Kurdistan Region as well as Iranian Kurdish parties. Yet when asked by a reporter whether the United States intended to arm the Kurds, Trump replied:

“We don’t want to make the war any more complex than it already is. We don’t want to see the Kurds get hurt or killed. We’ve had a good relationship with them. They’re willing to go in, but I’ve told them I don’t want them to go in.”

It is said that Trump’s shift regarding Iranian Kurdish political forces came as a result of lobbying by Turkey, which opposed U.S. support for the creation of a free zone in Iranian Kurdistan. At the same time that Trump’s remarks spread widely on social media, Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan stated that Secretary of State Rubio told him that the US does not intend to arm Iranian Kurds.

At the start of the second week of the war, the condition of the Iranian government is extremely dire. However, because of prior preparations and the decentralization of missile and drone operations among mid-level commanders, Tehran has still managed to launch attacks on positions belonging to the United States, Israel, and Arab allies hosting U.S. military bases. Even so, the Iranian regime has suffered extremely heavy blows, especially among its top leadership, and with internal divisions intensifying among the remaining officials, its main hope now lies in the continued missile and drone launches of the Revolutionary Guard.

On the other side, Trump, who had apparently prepared himself for a quick victory in the war (seemingly without any clear plan in case the conflict dragged on)—no longer finds himself in a comfortable position. The decline of the U.S. stock market and rising oil and gas prices in global markets, combined with continued disruptions to shipping in the Persian Gulf, could put the global economy at risk. The deaths of American soldiers, economic damage to Arab states caused by insecurity resulting from Iranian missile attacks, and growing public dissatisfaction with the course of the war in the United States are all placing the White House in a deeper dilemma.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu appears to be the only leader who entered the war with a clear plan and objective—after long seeking to bring the United States into a confrontation against his longstanding adversary, an enemy that had humiliated the Jewish state by supporting the terrorist attack carried out by Hamas on October 7.

At present, the people of Iran find themselves in extremely dire and frightening circumstances, with no clear outlook ahead. With U.S. support for Iranian Kurdistan as a potential liberated zone now effectively ruled out, and in the absence of a capable alternative leadership able to organize young people and the public to deliver a decisive blow against regime forces controlling streets and squares, the only tool left for the United States and Israel appears to be continued bombardment, striking the regime’s military centers as well as national infrastructure to reduce the Revolutionary Guard’s missile and drone capabilities to a minimum, or to compel remaining leaders to signal willingness for negotiations or surrender.

This comes even as, on the eighth day, a confidential report from eighteen U.S. intelligence agencies indicated that even a larger scale of aerial attacks and bombardments in Iran would not be able to change the Iranian regime. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that even if the remnants of the Islamic Republic manage to survive, they will no longer be able to govern as they did in the past.